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Abstract 
Functional overlap in the jurisdiction and competencies of international agreements can lead 
to incomplete and contradicting regulation, which erodes benefits form international coopera-
tion. The framework developed in this paper seeks to further the theoretical analysis of the 
domestic and international determinants for the origin and the persistence of such incoher-
ence. Using international regulation on the conservation of plant genetic resources as an illus-
trative example I address two theoretical challenges – the problem of cross-level inference in 
theories of international cooperation and the differentiation of processes of substantial bar-
gaining from those of negotiated institutional change. Substantial bargains can be formally 
analyzed as two-level or nested games with variable payoffs, whereas rigorous analysis of 
institutional change is limited by too many variations in game structure. I use the framework 
to derive a typology of games for guiding the systematic analysis of the international, domes-
tic and cross-level interactions that may offer explanations for the phenomenon of incoher-
ence due to functional overlap. 
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1 Introduction 
A prominent phenomenon in the system of international governance is that of substantial 
overlap in the jurisdiction and competencies of international agreements that have different 
but interrelated objectives. The effect of such overlaps in the functional scope of international 
agreements1 (Young 1996) is that the development and implementation of domestic policies is 
regulated by provisions of two or more international agreements. The most commonly known 
functional interdependencies are those that occur between multilateral environmental agree-
ments (MEAs) and international trade law, but similar problems occur in other fields of inter-
national governance such as trade and human rights, health or sanitation standards, as well as 
among individual MEAs. 
In most cases of overlap, the relationship between the relevant agreements is not clarified 
or it is formulated in an ambiguous way, leaving significant uncertainty and leeway for im-
plementation. The resulting incompleteness or contradiction in international law has detrimen-
tal effects to the achievement of the objectives of the different agreements because it leads to 
increased transaction costs and reduces the scope of the benefits that can be achieved through 
international cooperation. Therefore the reconciliation of such incoherence is a central aspect 
of the effectiveness of international governance.  
In this paper, I argue that existing descriptive analysis and empirical evidence for the oc-
currence, and particularly the persistence, of incoherence due to functional overlap is not 
compatible with theories of international relations that view states as rational actors taking 
decisions in their own interest. The puzzle is that states with assumed uniform and stable 
preferences invest considerable amounts of resources in the negotiation and implementation 
of international agreements and should have a reasonable interest in reconciling overlaps once 
they become aware of the costs of incoherence. Even if overlaps are initially unintended con-
sequences and may not be immediately become apparent to, nor be dealt with by the parties 
(Young 1996), states should be motivated to seek solutions as incoherence is revealed in the 
course of institutional interactions. 
                                                 
1  I use the term international agreements to refer to the formal rules of international interactions and provisions for 
domestic implementation, laid out in conventions, protocols, treaties and other constitutive documents. An international 
institution comprises the social practices that are based on the rules of the game including common discourses in terms of 
which to address the issues at stake, informal understandings regarding appropriate behavior on the part of participants, 
and routine activities that grow up in conjunction with efforts to implement the rules (Scott 1995). International 
agreements are the outcome of negotiation processes among states that are themselves subject to the formal and informal 
rules of international negotiations. 
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This paper develops a conceptual framework as first step towards an approach to solve the 
puzzle and to evaluate possible explanations for the lack of reconciliation of incoherence due 
to functional overlaps. I start from the premise that two types of interactions – those among 
different negotiation arenas that produce international agreements, and the impact of domestic 
policy making, particularly policy coordination, on the positions of the negotiators – need to 
be taken into consideration in order to explain the origin and persistence of incoherence in 
international governance. An expanded two-level games framework is developed in section 4 
to account for the possible nesting of games at the domestic or international levels. Based on 
this framework, some considerations about the nature of the games and the adequate level of 
theoretical rigor for their analysis can be derived. Beforehand, section 2 gives a more detailed 
overview over the problem of incoherence due to functional overlap and section 3 discusses 
briefly the theoretical challenges faced in the study of such problems. Section 5 summarizes 
and gives an outlook on future research. 
2 Effects of Incoherence in International Law 
In this section I use the case of international regulation of the conservation and use of plant 
genetic resources to illustrate some of the effects of incompleteness and contradictions in in-
ternational law that arise out of functional overlap. The framework developed in this paper is 
intended to be applied to this case, however, the phenomenon occurs widely in international 
governance and is bound to increase in importance as the density of international agreements 
increases (Young 2002).  
In the recent past there have been a number of bi- or multilateral conflicts over the regula-
tion of access to, and the use of, genetic resources as well as over the protection of intellectual 
property related to their commercial exploitation. In most of these conflicts a user party is 
accused by a supplying actor of having acquired legal property protection over Plant Genetic 
Resources (PGRs) or related traditional knowledge for commercial use without providing an 
adequate share of the benefits to the providers. In such cases of ‘biopiracy’ like the Neem 
patents (Shiva 1997; Utkarsh et al. 1999; Gadgil and Utkarsh 1999) or the basmati rice case 
(Prakash 2000) the supplying actors claim their rights to be compensated for their contribu-
tion to the commercial value of the resources and associated knowledge, on which the innova-
tion has been based. Such rights have been granted to them through the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity (CBD), while the basis for conceding legal protection of property rights over 
biotechnological innovations is laid out in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
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lectual Property Rights (TRIPs) of the World Trade Organization (WTO 1994). The CBD 
grants national sovereignty over genetic resources and requires owner countries to establish 
access legislation that respects the rights of the communities in possession of genetic re-
sources to fairly and equitably share the benefits that arise out of the use of these resources 
(CBD Arts. 15 and 19). The implementation of such legislation, however, requires compatible 
legislation on the side of the user countries such as a requirement to provide a certificate of 
origin and a proof of benefit-sharing provisions accepted when genetic resources are im-
ported, or as a condition for the granting of patents over biotechnological innovations. So far 
user countries have not shown much effort to adjust their legislation in that sense (Rosendal 
1999). Similarly, TRIPs requires all countries to implement minimum standards for the pro-
tection of intellectual property rights, including some form of protection of newly developed 
plant varieties (TRIPs Art. 27). Traditional communities perceive this form of individual 
property rights to be incompatible with the collective ownership prevailing in their communi-
ties. 
The parallel emergence of these agreements and their different approaches to regulate the 
protection of property rights – over genetic resources with a view to create incentives for their 
conservation in the CBD, and over new knowledge related to biotechnological innovations in 
the context of TRIPs (Dutfield 1999) – have hampered their implementation on both sides. 
The provisions in the overlap of the two agreements are incomplete, because they lack a clear 
notion of the scope of intellectual property protection and its limitation through the rights that 
are awarded to the traditional owners of plant genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 
They lead to conflicts in implementation because there is no mechanism or rule on how the 
diverging objectives of biodiversity conservation and new knowledge protection should be 
reconciled. So far there has not been much of a systematic analysis of the impacts of incoher-
ence, nevertheless, four broad types of costs and efficiency losses arising out of the present 
situation can be identified: 
• Trade offs: The implementation of overlapping agreements often confronts countries with 
economic trade-offs, as compliance with one agreement may limit the extent to which they 
can benefit from the implementation of another. A typical example is the recent discussion 
about Brazil’s law on access to genetic resources and its negative impacts on research and 
development (SciDevNet 2003)2. 
                                                 
2  Brazil's biopiracy laws are stifling research (www.SciDev.net, July 21st, 2003). Brazilian scientists are urging the 
government to modify laws that have been introduced to reduce biopiracy, in order to give them more freedom to collect 
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• Complexity in legislation: Overlapping agreements may require very complex legislative 
systems and institutions that specify how the provisions affect the rights and responsibili-
ties of a multitude of domestic actors. From the perspective of poor countries with low ca-
pacities in development and enforcement of new legislation, TRIPs represents an addi-
tional burden that complicates the implementation of the CBD. Obviously, rich and poor 
countries alike have a bias towards implementing agreements that they perceive to be most 
beneficial for them. This may lead to a strategic delay in the implementation of function-
ally linked agreements and prevent the achievement of a sufficient rate of participation. 
• Conflicts and enforcement costs: Conflicts like the cases of biopiracy described above arise 
easily when legislation is incomplete or ambiguous. Arbitrage in these conflicts is costly 
and may bind administrative resources that are detracted for other aspects of implementa-
tion. 
• Legitimized non-compliance: Contradicting or ambiguous provisions can be exploited stra-
tegically by countries to circumvent the implementation of provisions that are costly to 
them, and thereby free-ride on the effort of other countries. For instance many industrial-
ized countries have so far refused to include a requirement to disclose the origin of genetic 
resources in patent applications to facilitate benefit sharing according to CBD provisions, 
arguing that such a requirement is incompatible with the TRIPs agreement (Carvalho 
2000). These countries nevertheless seek to benefit from improved access to genetic re-
sources in supplier countries that have already implemented access laws. 
These effects erode the benefits of cooperation that are the very objective of the negotiation of 
international agreements. No matter whether the objective is to create welfare gains through 
the harmonization of international commercial standards, or to enhance cooperation in the 
protection of the environment and the provision of a global pubic good, incoherence due to 
functional overlap leads to restrictions in the extent of cooperative benefits that can be real-
ized.  
It is striking that participants at the relevant forums are well aware of the compatibility 
problems among different agreements. Several submissions have been made to the TRIPs 
council regarding the disclosure requirement and related issues are heavily debated at every 
                                                                                                                                                        
and analyze biological material for research purposes.  [...] The motion calls for the government to grant 'permanent 
licenses' to scientists and research students to allow them to investigate biodiversity. Its aim is to end the way in which 
current regulations, many scientists argue, hinder their ability to work with animals, plants, micro-organisms and 
ecosystems. [...] 
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conference of the parties of the CBD3. Despite the technical difficulties that the implementa-
tion of such a requirement would entail, there is substantial room to craft a solution to the 
problem once the general necessity to integrate this measure is accepted (Carvalho 2000).  
 
2.1 Strategic Exploitation, Different Norms or Distributive Effects? 
This discussion provokes the question if countries that benefit from such incoherence are able 
to strategically exploit the functional overlap among agreements. If so, this would imply that 
the beneficiaries have an incentive to prevent the reconciliation of functional overlaps and – 
taking the argument one step further – to seek to increase the scope of overlap in order to 
broaden their opportunities to benefit. This strategic behavior is indeed one of the most ap-
pealing explanations offered in the literature to date. Oran Young (2002) in his analysis of the 
“politics of institutional interplay” has provided a detailed description of strategic decisions in 
the negotiation process that influence the extent of institutional interplay. He argues that the 
scope of overlap is in most cases the result of conscious decisions on the fundamental aspects 
of the design of international agreements, such as the framing of the issue, the choice of the 
arena under whose auspices to negotiate and administer an agreement, or operational links in 
the institutional set-up (e.g. common administrative services or dispute settling). This sup-
ports Schelling’s notion that actors in international negotiations find themselves in a mixed-
motive situation that complicates the pursuit of the common good (Schelling 1960). Therefore 
the politics of institutional linkages normally feature a “complex mix of efforts to enhance 
social welfare and promote the interest of individual participants” (Young 2002: 138). 
Another explanation for the persistence of incoherence due to functional overlap empha-
sizes the role of different normative principles and rules that dominate in different agreements 
(Rosendal 1999; 2001). The CBD seeks to regulate property rights in order to improve equity 
and create incentives for conservation, while TRIPs aims at the protection of private benefits 
in order to promote innovation. These diverging normative orientations lead to a number of 
contentious questions regarding the patentable subject matter (patents over biological infor-
mation), the beneficiaries of patents (social and equity aspects), impacts on food security and 
health (moral aspects), and environmental impacts. The lack of a common understanding of 
these concerns may act as an insurmountable barrier in the search for integrated measures. 
                                                 
3  See WTO documents IP/C/W/368, 370 and 420. Submission 420 refers to “more than 25 communications that have been 
submitted on the subject to date”. (WTO 2002a, 2002b, 2004) 
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Finally, a third explanation asserts that the diffusion of basic managerial principles across 
different agreements and their integration is hampered by their allocative effects (Stokke 
2000). Decisions that have allocative implications are the most contentious issues in negotia-
tions and are usually based on fragile systems of interlinked rights and obligations. In many 
cases, altering this balance in order to reconcile functional overlap may lead to a loss of sup-
port for the agreement or require a general re-negotiation.  
These explanations, though intuitively appealing, are not readily compatible with com-
monly applied theories of international relations that understand negotiations as processes of 
strategic interactions among states. This is mainly due to their conception of the state as uni-
tary actor with broadly uniform and stable preferences (i.e., uniform and stable normative 
orientations and distributive interests). Consequently, they cannot account for domestic fac-
tors, such as variances in the institutions of domestic decision making or the existence of dif-
ferent domestic policy fields that influence international decision making according to their 
interests and preferences. Explanations based on strategy, differing norms or distributive ef-
fects, however, will be much more consistent, if they are rooted in the perceptions, prefer-
ences and interests of actor groups that are defined in less generally aggregated categories 
than the state. 
The next section discusses this problem in further detail and derives some basic requisites 
of an approach that seeks to systematically incorporate domestic determinants of international 
politics. 
2.2 International, Domestic and Cross-Level International Interactions  
The discussion so far motivates an analysis of the phenomenon of incoherence due to func-
tional overlap as outcome of at least two types of interactions – the interplay and mutual in-
fluence among negotiation processes at the international level of political decision making 
and the relationship between domestic constituent groups and the negotiators’ positions and 
strategies on the international level. What is the impact of these interactions on the outcomes 
of international negotiations?  
Generally outcomes are legal texts that become binding to those states that ratify a negoti-
ated agreement. Next to the provisions that countries have to implement (substantive aspects), 
international agreements usually include rules for changing or further developing the substan-
tive aspects of the agreement (procedural aspects), and notions on the future goals and visions 
that the agreement pursues (symbolic aspects) (Congleton 2001; see also Barrett 1998). Taken 
together, the negotiation process, and the procedural and symbolic aspects of the agreements 
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it produces, provide a system of formal and informal rules that constitutes the institutions of 
international decision making in a given issue area. Apart from the basic principles of negotia-
tion, such as voting rules and conference procedures, the formal rules of the negotiation proc-
ess are to a large extent changeable to the process itself4. This fact is most relevant with re-
gard to agenda setting and decisions about the formation of new agreements as this may have 
a fundamental impact of the future interplay and overlap among agreements (Young 2002). 
The initial mandate for negotiations on a new agreement is typically determined by a higher 
level arena, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme (UNEP) or the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development 
UNCSD that decides to establish a new process. It also determines the status of the new 
agreement (convention, self standing treaty, protocol) and thereby its autonomy and the con-
trol its members have over rule changes. 
The substantive aspects are the actual output of negotiations and the problem of functional 
overlap appears here5. The process of negotiations has a significant impact on this output 
(Barrett 1998), not only because it determines who can participate in the negotiations and 
what are the time frames for reaching agreement, but also because it affects the possibilities of 
a negotiating body to react to the outcomes from other arenas. The sequencing of negotiations 
may exclude linkages between different issues that could lead to a lower degree of incoher-
ence (Rosendal 2003). The interaction among negotiation processes is thus of essential impor-
tance for the incidence as well as the reconciliation of functional overlaps. 
After an agreement was adopted it has to be ratified by the countries wishing to accede. 
Once the agreement enters into force, negotiating bodies continue to develop mechanisms and 
programmes for implementation. The outcome of these subsequent negotiations may – in the 
case of protocols or additional treaties – or may not be subject to additional ratification proce-
dures. The procedures and requirements for ratification are very different across countries 
such as majority or qualified majority decisions by one or several bodies of domestic decision 
making. These requirements determine the amount of domestic support a negotiator needs in 
order to achieve the ratification of an international agreement at the domestic level. They 
                                                 
4  The general principles for the negotiation of international agreements, such as principles of treaty adoption, choice of 
voting rules, access to negotiations, etc., are laid out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). This means 
that some rules of international negotiations are exogenously fixed, while others are changeable to the process itself, 
subject to fixed procedures. 
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therefore have an influence on which constituencies and actor groups can influence the strat-
egy and position of the international level negotiator. These dynamic relationship between 
international and domestic decision making is the second type of interaction that needs to be 
included in the framework. 
The domestic ratification constraint, and its influence on international negotiations has 
been first described by Putnam (1988) in the ‘Logic of Two-Level Games’. His framework 
provides a conceptual link between domestic and international decision-making processes and 
offers a systematic approach to the identification of domestic determinants of international 
politics. So far applications of the framework have assumed a single international arena in 
which decisions are taken unaffected by other international processes. The main objective in 
this paper is to expand the framework to multiple and interacting negotiation processes and to 
explore the implications for a systematic analysis of the domestic and international determi-
nants of functional overlaps and the politics of incoherence. 
3 Explaining International Cooperation 
This section briefly reviews the most commonly applied theories that seek to explain the evo-
lution of international environmental cooperation, using rational choice and economic theo-
retical concepts to derive their conclusions. The theories are similar in their view that the de-
cision making actor takes well informed decisions according to some known preference rank-
ing or utility function. They differ in their assumptions about the nature of the actor and the 
source of utility that is referred to in order to characterize the motivation of the actor and to 
find plausible explanations for decisions in different situations. They also vary in their degree 
of formalization of rational choice arguments. Some use game-theoretic reasoning as heuristic 
tool for the elaboration of verbal theories – as guide to description, while others use formal 
models to make logically consistent inferences from a set of explicit assumptions – as guide 
to the deductive formulation of testable hypotheses (Snidal 2004). The aim of this review is to 
provide insights into the theoretical challenges that have been encountered in the study of 
international cooperation and how they have been addressed. 
Among the different research fields of international relations, security studies has been the 
first to use formal rational choice models. Consequently, the work of Richardson on interna-
                                                                                                                                                        
5  Note that agreements frequently provide for interactions of negotiation processes in the form of requests on joint work 
programmes or the organization of joint conferences. These interactions would fall under Young’s definition of 
operational interplay (Young 2002), which is not taken into account at this point of the discussion. 
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tional arms races (Richardson 1960), Schelling on the Strategy of Conflict (Schelling 1960) 
and others are often referred to when formal models for other issues in international relations 
are to developed. Schelling was also first to postulate the influence of domestic policies on 
international decision making, the so called “Schelling conjecture” that domestic constraints 
improve the bargaining position in international negotiations (Tarar 2001). The economic 
analysis of international institutions and cooperation was brought forward among others by 
Keohane who showed that states have an interest in the creation of international institutions 
that lower the transaction costs of international cooperation (Keohane 1984), Axelrod and his 
analysis of the effect of different strategies in repeated games on the development of interna-
tional cooperation (Axelrod 1984), and Oye who showed how international regimes can alter 
the structure and payoffs of games that are played under the conditions of anarchy (Oye 
1986). 
The use of game theoretical models to explain international negotiations has also been 
prominent in research on international environmental cooperation. Three different approaches 
have developed in this field: Regime Theory, economic theories of international environ-
mental cooperation, and two-level games approaches. 
3.1 Regime Theory and the Problem of Cross-Level Inference 
In the study of international relations in political sciences systemic concepts that seek to de-
rive explanations from the analysis of the international structure have dominated in the study 
of the determinants of international stability and cooperation. For the analysis of MEAs the 
concept of Regime Theory has become one of the most successful approaches currently ap-
plied. Regimes are systems of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures, around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue-area 
(Krasner 1991). They consist of formal and informal international arrangements, and are a 
forum for bargaining and information exchange for the development of scientifically 
grounded and consensually accepted rules and norms to resolve global environmental prob-
lems and to ensure the provision of global environmental goods . The central actors of re-
gimes are states that take rational decisions in order to maximize power or wealth. The factors 
determining the behavior of the individual state origin in the regime structure, which is deter-
mined by issue specific international factors, including power relations, relative orientations 
for action and reputation (Neumayer 2001). 
As in many other fields of political sciences researchers on international relations differen-
tiate between levels of analysis from which to seek explanations for international outcomes. 
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‘Level’ of analysis can be understood in two different ways: (1) as different possible loci of 
explanatory factors such as the individual, domestic and international levels; or (2) as differ-
ent social entities or aggregates of actors (Ray 2001)6. There has been an extensive debate 
about the specific insights that can be expected from the analysis of factors from different 
systemic loci (domestic or international level) and in what ways the different levels influence 
each other. In international relations the debate has centered around two alternative view-
points. One being that the structure of the international system alone determines state behav-
ior in foreign politics (international explanations), while the other claims that state behavior 
does not respond to the international system, but constitutes it (domestic explanations) 
(Moravcsik 1993). 
The separation of international from domestic explanations is motivated by problems that 
arise when data from different levels of analysis is aggregated for analysis. Relationships 
found on one level do not necessarily hold on other levels of analysis even if data on the same 
variables was gathered and analyzed in the same way. This problem of aggregation bias can, 
for example, lead to a distorted representation of the preferences of a coalition of countries if 
a few countries strongly oppose a proposal that receives support from most of the group 
members. The negotiating position of the group will reflect mainly opposition and not reveal 
the differentiated preferences of the supporting majority of its members (Sprinz 2000).  
Such problems of fallacy in cross-level inference have led analysts to concentrate on one 
single level of analysis. In the past, approaches based on international explanations have 
dominated in the area of international relations. For the purpose of systemic analysis the do-
mestic level factors are treated as constants. It is assumed that (1) states are unitary actors that 
respond to external incentives; (2) states have stable and broadly similar domestic prefer-
ences; (3) states have stable and broadly similar decision-making procedures; and (4) states 
have stable and broadly similar abilities to extract resources from society. In many cases the 
restrictiveness of these assumptions, however, “leads to a degeneration of pure international 
theories under the collective weight of empirical anomalies and theoretical limitations into 
explanations that include domestic factors.” (Moravcsik 1993: 14) Domestic variables are 
introduced by relaxing any of the fundamental constraints in order to account for ‘residual 
variance’ in the explanations of international systemic theory. Such a practice however, 
“tends to encourage ad hoc interpretations rather than explicit theories about the interaction 
                                                 
6  The different definitions have implications on the integration of levels of analysis. The discussion here focuses on the 
problem of integrating explanatory factors from different loci.  
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between domestic and international politics. [...] the analyst is left without guidance about 
which domestic influences to emphasize”(Moravcsik 1993: 14). 
The problems of cross-level inference have therefore hampered the development of ana-
lytical approaches that systematically combine explanatory factors from different levels of 
analysis. Yet, such a systematic approach is needed in order to account for variations in do-
mestic constraints between negotiators of different countries as well as in different policy 
fields.  
These variations may be related to differing preferences of domestic-level constituent 
groups, and depend on a groups’ affectedness by the problem. Furthermore it is important to 
account for the influence of domestic institutions of political decision-making. These may or 
may not adequately represent the interests of the majority of the constituency. Relaxing the 
fundamental assumptions, will reduce the deductive power of systemic reasoning and lead to 
conclusions that can hardly be generalized and tested for a broad number of cases (Snidal 
2004). 
An alternative solution that has been proposed is to make simplifying assumptions about 
the leaders of states or their representatives rather than the state as an aggregate unit of analy-
sis. Assuming that the highest priority for leaders of states is to stay in power (De Mesquita 
2002), facilitates the integration of causal factors pertaining to different ‘levels of analysis’, at 
least for those who see such levels as referring by definition primarily to the locus of explana-
tory factors. It provides a basis to combine explanatory factors in a logically consistent and 
theoretically coherent fashion (Ray 2001). 
Turning towards the state leader or his or her representatives, however raises another prob-
lem related to the issues of levels of analysis – that of the adequate level of theoretic rigor. 
This is especially relevant when it comes to the application of formal models as means of 
theoretic inference. Game theoretic modeling is applied by both, international relations theory 
and economic theories of international cooperation.  
3.2 Economic Theories of International Cooperation – The Frontiers of Formal Game-
theoretic Reasoning 
In economics the analysis of international environmental cooperation has focused primarily 
on the study of the conditions and determinants of self-enforcing and re-negotiation-proof 
agreements (Barrett 1999; Helm 2000; Neumayer 2001). These conditions are derived from 
the characterization of international cooperation as “cooperation under anarchy” (Oye 1986) 
referring to the lack of an enforcing supra-national agency. States are assumed to be unitary, 
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utility maximizing actors that decide rationally, taking into account all available information. 
Through the negotiation of mutually beneficial agreements, they seek to achieve gains from 
cooperation, which is the driving force for international cooperation (Neumayer 2001). In 
order to develop game-theoretical models of state behavior that can be put to empirical test-
ing, it is further assumed that all aspects of costs and benefits can be represented in a utility 
function, such that the actors are faced with a well-specified payoff matrix. In this way 
economists have been able to derive many fruitful conclusions about problems of free-riding, 
strategic incentives, side payments, and leakage effects in international environmental coop-
eration (Barrett 1994; Helm 1998). Economic models have also been used to investigate con-
ditions such as fair burden sharing, scientific uncertainty and dynamic and iterated interac-
tions (Helm 2000). 
If the focus of analysis is to be shifted from the behavior of the state to that of the state 
leader or representative to account for variations in domestic constraints, economic theories 
encounter a similar problem as systemic theories of international relations. Changing the fun-
damental assumptions of the theory in order to incorporate domestic level factors has much 
more far reaching implications for the use of formal than for verbal theory. In Regime Theory 
game theoretic models are frequently used to illustrate the structure of a problem and as a 
heuristic tool to guide the search for new explanations. This ‘metaphorical’ use of game the-
ory that seeks to establish correspondences between the international political system and, for 
example, firms in an oligopolistic market is fundamentally different from the development of 
a formal deductive structure plus an interpretation of the fundamental assumptions and theo-
retical constructs that provide for a greater richness of explanation (Snidal 1986). Snidal ar-
gues that the metaphorical use of game theory restricts its explanatory power to descriptive 
rather than analytical uses.  
Too many “applications” of game theory have merely been in the spirit of sorting out whether the Cuban 
missile crisis was really a Chicken or a Prisoners’ Dilemma. Such usage may be helpful for reconstruct-
ing and interpreting particular events, but it misinterprets the primary value of game theory as that of re-
describing the world, and is therefore limited as a test of game theory. (Snidal 1986: 26). 
As a formal deductive structure, economic theories of international environmental cooperation 
make assumptions about the key elements of game theoretical explanations (actors, rules, 
payoffs, timeliness). These define and restrict the range from which explanatory variables can 
be chosen. While this limits the usefulness of game models as heuristic guideline to stimulate 
exploration and discovery their deductive power allows to move beyond descriptions to infer-
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ences from the assumptions. Formal models help to test the logical consistency of an argu-
ment, locate its errors or specify the conditions under which it holds (De Mesquita and Mor-
row 1999; Snidal 2004). Changing the basic conception of states as unitary and self-interested 
actors that take rational decisions according to their preferences does not make formal analy-
sis impossible. Yet the development of a consistent and robust deductive structure that ac-
commodates the wealth of existing descriptive arguments and empirical observations requires 
careful step by step analysis and testing. Consequently the application of game theory is not 
necessarily restricted to metaphorical uses, but taking the complexity of the interactions into 
account, it has to be carefully evaluated what level of theoretical rigor can be expected from 
an approach that alters the fundamental assumptions of the theoretical framework. 
In summary, a systematic framework that aims at the analysis of incoherence due to func-
tional overlap among international agreements has to take interactions among different nego-
tiation processes on the international level into account, as well as variances in domestic con-
straints of the negotiating actors. This requires the combination of explanatory factors from 
two levels of analysis, the international system and domestic level decision making. The inte-
gration of these levels can be done consistently only by changing the focus of the analysis 
towards the behavior of the negotiating statesman and making assumptions about his or her 
priorities, rather than the characteristics of states. These changes alter the deductive structure 
of economic theories in international relations implying challenges for rigorous game-
theoretic reasoning and the general validity of insights that can be expected from it. 
4 International Negotiations as Nested Games on Two-Levels of Decision 
Making 
4.1 The Metaphor of Two-Level Games 
The first step to develop a conceptual framework for the analysis of the behavior of individual 
statesmen or negotiators to explain the outcome of international negotiations was made by 
Putnam in the ‘Logic of Two-Level Games’ (Putnam 1988). Putnam views the negotiating 
statesman as an individual who seeks to maximize his payoffs in two simultaneous and inter-
dependent games on the domestic and international levels:  
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favor-
able policies and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the interna-
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tional level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while 
minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam 1988: 436). 
The payoffs of the statesman are determined by the effects of a given decision on the politi-
cians’ domestic power, the effect on the realization of the states’ interests on the international 
level and by the realization of the private preferences of the statesman. The set of feasible 
decisions that the statesman can negotiate (win-set) is constrained on the domestic level to the 
options the constituency will ratify. In the international arena the statesman must bargain with 
his opponents for solutions that lie in the overlap of his own and his opponents’ win-sets. 
Within this set of negotiable and ratifiable solutions the statesman possesses partial autonomy 
to negotiate. (Figure 1)  
Figure 1: The concept of win-sets in two-level games  
Source: Compiled by the author 
The win-set is the conceptual link between the domestic and international determinants of the 
negotiators’ behavior. Putnam mentions three sets of factors that determine the size of the 
win-set (Putnam 1988: 443): 
• The distribution of power, preferences and possible coalitions among Level II (domestic 
level) constituents: The size of the win-set depends on the cost of no-agreement (the bene-
fit foregone of maintaining the status quo) of those groups and coalitions that support the 
statesman (political parties, labor unions, environmental associations, etc.). The lower this 
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cost, the more skeptical will they be about international solutions and thus, the smaller will 
be the win-set of the negotiator. 
• The size of the domestic win-set depends on the Level II political institutions: These are 
the domestic ratification procedures and institutional factors that increase or decrease the 
likeliness of ratification. The win-set is larger if the majority necessary for ratification is 
weaker (a simple majority requires less support than a two-thirds majority). Other factors 
such as coalition or single party governments, political discipline within the governing 
party, or the general autonomy of the government from domestic pressures affect the win-
set as well. 
• The size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiator. If a negotiator 
has a large win-set it will be easy to conclude an agreement, but the bargaining position is 
stronger if the win-set is small. Therefore, the negotiator has an interest in applying strate-
gies to influence the own or the opponents’ win-set, such as increasing the popularity of 
the opponent at home, international side-payments or the choice of the chief negotiator. 
The two-level games approach allows to focus on the interactions between national and inter-
national politics and accounts for the influence of the political economy of domestic level 
decision making on international outcomes. It also differs from Regime Theory and economic 
theories of international cooperation in its focus on the statesman as central strategic actor 
(Moravcsik 1993). It thereby allows to integrate different levels of a analysis as loci of ex-
planatory factors to systematically explore the relationship between domestic and interna-
tional constraints to decision making.  
4.2 Nested Games 
In order to integrate interactions between different international processes the two-level 
games framework has to be expanded. This can be done by embedding it into the broader 
conception of ‘Nested Games’ (Tsebelis 1990).  
The intention of the nested games framework is to provide an empirically accurate and 
theoretically coherent account of apparently sub-optimal choices – cases where an actor, con-
fronted with a series of choices, does not pick the alternative that appears to be best. Such 
behavior can be puzzling because it seems to violate the assumption that actors are rational 
and seek to make choices that maximize their benefits. Contrary to many scholars who ex-
plain the existence of sub-optimal choices through the introduction of limitations to the ac-
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tors’ rationality (bounded rationality), Tsebelis argues that cases of apparently sub-optimal 
choice “are in fact cases of disagreement between the perspectives of the actor and the ob-
server” (Tsebelis 1990: 7). This means that the observer is not able to see that the actor may 
have taken the impact of his or her actions on other decisions into account. The actor is in-
volved in a whole network of games. “What appears sub-optimal from the perspective of only 
one game is in fact optimal when the whole network of games is considered” (Tsebelis 1990: 
7). 
Figure 2: Graphic representation of nested games over two levels 
Source: compiled by the author 
This explanation implies that the range of analysis must be expanded to cover the whole net-
work of games that an actor may be considering in order to broaden the perspective of the 
observer and allow for a better understanding of the actors’ choice. The games in this network 
are differentiated into games in the principal arena (the decisions that the observer wants to 
explain) and games in other arenas (related decisions that the actor may have taken into ac-
count). 
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4.3 International Interactions 
Figure 2 depicts how the games of international politics can be nested over two levels of deci-
sion making. The vertical arrows represent the interactions between international and domes-
tic processes of decision making. These are the two-level games in Putnam’s sense. The inter-
actions among different international negotiation processes are represented by the upper hori-
zontal arrow. These interactions include all possible influences that one negotiation process 
may have on the outcome of another, including formal messages conveyed to another process 
through decisions or secretariat notes, informal communications among delegates, and – what 
may be of most importance – direct or indirect influences on the positions and negotiation 
strategies of negotiators in another arena. The latter point refers to the extent to which nego-
tiators take the existing or anticipated outcomes in other arenas into account for their own 
negotiations. If these interactions lead to a change in the outcome, they can in most cases eas-
ily be identified in the final decision text.  
This is the case for example in the way the CBD has addressed anticipated conflicts with 
the TRIPs agreement in the area of access and benefits sharing with regard to genetic re-
sources. The inclusion of an article in the convention text specifying that IPR systems “should 
not run counter to the objectives of the CBD” (Article 16.5) can be seen as direct response to 
what was being negotiated in the Uruguay Round under the TRIPs agreement (Rosendal 
2003). Similarly the CBD Conference of the Parties has repeatedly asked to examine the rela-
tionship between CBD and TRIPs7. In response to these decisions several investigations of the 
relationship and aspects of functional overlap and potential conflicts were carried out showing 
that negotiators of a significant group of countries are well aware of these aspects (WTO 
2002a).  
The detection of the influence is more difficult if no explicit references are made to other 
agreements or negotiating forums. In this case it is not clear whether the absence of official 
references is due to a lack of general awareness, or to the fact that no consensus could be 
reached. Independent of the content of references in the outcome, it is of interest to study the 
motivation of the parties that push for, or oppose to, explicit reference in order to trace the 
interests they are pursuing. Are these interests in support of the objectives of the agreement at 
stake? Can they be related to goals that are in the jurisdiction of other agreements or are they 
supporting the exclusive interests of a particular actor group that seeks to exploit international 
cooperation to its own ends? 
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4.4 Domestic Interactions 
Two types of domestic interactions and their influence on international decision making are 
important in order to understand the motivations of the negotiators. On the one hand, the di-
rect relationship between the negotiator and the constituents affected by one particular agree-
ment requires attention. How do environmentalist groups influence policy strategies at the 
CBD, and how do opposing groups express their concerns? However, of equal importance is 
the relationship between the policy fields corresponding to overlapping agreements. Are these 
fields integrated or separated? Separated fields are likely if the responsibility and authority for 
agreements is born entirely with different ministries. If these ministries are controlled by dif-
ferent factions of a government (e.g., a division of responsibilities in a two-party coalition 
government) the separation may be even more pronounced8. The separation of policy fields is 
likely to be reduced through coordinating mechanisms, such as a guiding function of the for-
eign affairs department or an inter-ministerial committee.  
Separated policy fields on the domestic level would offer an explanation for non-aligned 
positions of a country in different negotiation forums, if these differences arise out of differ-
entiated norms and principles that prevail in the policy field across different levels of domes-
tic decision making. Individuals within one policy field are interacting more closely with 
members of the same policy field in other countries than across policy fields at home. Simi-
larly, a separation on the political level can lead to strong specialized links between affected 
constituent groups and ‘their’ negotiators. This would also make an explanation based on dis-
tributive structures more plausible.  
If inconsistencies are due to strategic considerations, however, one would expect a higher 
degree of policy integration, strong control by the government over foreign policy develop-
ment, or at least a sophisticated mechanism for policy coordination. Strategic exploitation of 
functional overlap requires advanced structures of information processing, coordinated policy 
development and a high degree of control by those actors who seek to benefit from such ef-
forts. The extent of integration and coordination among policy fields is likely to be one of the 
key domestic determinants of international policy making. Nevertheless, it is difficult to es-
tablish a clear relationship because the motives of the decision makers may be ambiguous.  
                                                                                                                                                        
7  See Decisions IV/15, VI/20 and VII/26 of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD (CBD 1998, 2002,2004) 
8  For example, environmental issues may be dealt with by a green party while economic policy is under the authority of a 
social democrat or conservative party, a scenario resembling the current situation in Germany. 
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This very brief discussion of domestic interactions shows, that the identification of domes-
tic games that serve as explanation for international incoherence will be a difficult undertak-
ing. The mere analysis of domestic policy coordination and constituent group influence is 
unlikely to lead to explanations that are univocal. The task is therefore to enrich this frame-
work with theoretical arguments that allow to derive empirically testable hypotheses on the 
influence of clearly definable characteristics of the institutions and processes of domestic 
level decision making on international politics. 
4.5 Differentiating Games 
One way to move forward on this challenge is to identify the situations in which rigorous 
game-theoretical analysis is useful and under which conditions its conclusions will be mean-
ingful. This section seeks to develop some propositions for the differentiation of interactions 
according to a typology of games to which different theoretical methods can be applied.  
As was mentioned above, the shift from states to individual negotiators as unit of theoreti-
cal analysis raises the question of the usefulness of formalized models of negotiator behavior. 
Tsebelis conceptualizes two types of nested games that may serve as a step in exploring the 
nature of the games we are likely to encounter along the arrows in the framework – games in 
multiple arenas and games in institutional design (Tsebelis 1990: 8): 
• Games in multiple arenas are games, in which the payoffs in the principal arena are contin-
gent on the actors’ choice in one or more other arenas. In this case the observer may not be 
aware that the actor is maximizing benefits over several games. Variations of the payoffs 
in the principle arena are determined by events in the other arenas. Games in multiple are-
nas provide a tool to take the contextual factors of a decision into account. 
• Games in institutional design are games in which the rules of the game are contingent on 
the actors’ choice in another arena. Here the actor is involved in a higher order game where 
choices between different games (different sets of rules in the principal arena) can be 
made. The rules of the game are variable and the actor may be able to choose a previously 
unavailable option. Games in institutional design provide a tool to interpret institutional 
change as conscious planning by the actors involved. 
The advantage of the nested games approach is, that it allows to differentiate between contex-
tual factors of decisions and processes of institutional change. Games in institutional design 
expand the observers’ perspective over longer time horizons, while games in multiple arenas 
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broaden the view over contextual games. Tsebelis develops a full theoretical treatment of 
games in multiple arenas that can be used to analyze the effects of different interdependencies 
among games, how these alter the payoffs in the principal arena and what their effect is on the 
outcome of the game. It allows to analyze scenarios of contingent strategies and iterated 
games under different assumptions with regard to available information, game sequence and 
structure, using the backward induction argument and the criterion of subgame perfectness 
(see for example Morrow 1994). 
Such a complete theoretical treatment is not possible for games in institutional design, as 
“institutional change by definition involves political innovation, and it is difficult (if not im-
possible) to know its rules” (Tsebelis 1990: 10). But the approach does allow to explore proc-
esses of institutional design, and to develop a verbal analysis of the conditions under which 
they are likely to occur. If it is possible to distinguish the two types of games in the frame-
work in Figure 2 each can be approached using the appropriate theoretical rigor. Applying the 
concepts of two-level games and nested games to the situation of international negotiations 
allows to derive several basic propositions to support this endeavor. If we adopt Tsebelis’ 
premise that games can only vary in payoffs, or in rules (with rules comprising the actors of 
the game, their available strategies and information, and the sequencing of moves) and its 
implication that games in multiple arenas and games in institutional design are mutually ex-
clusive (Tsebelis 1990: 93) we can state the following: 
The rules that guide and restrict the interactions among states during negotiations are ei-
ther fixed or subject to change by the decision of the members of the negotiating body. Ac-
tors outside of the negotiation process cannot change the rules. Therefor,e the interactions 
among different international arenas are exclusively games in multiple arenas. (Proposi-
tion 1) 
Furthermore, recalling Putnam’s conception of the win-set as conceptual link between the 
domestic and the international negotiation game, we can propose that influences that can be 
explained as effects of changes in the size of the win-set can also be exclusively understood as 
games in multiple arenas. This is because of the two main implications that Putnam postulates 
(Putnam 1988: 441): 
• The size of the Level II win-set determines the probability of reaching a Level I agreement, 
while the overlap between the win-sets of different negotiators determines the area of pos-
sible consensus (i.e., the total possible gains from cooperation). Together these two effects 
determine the expected payoffs of the game. 
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• The relative seize of a negotiators’ win-set determines the distribution of the joint gains 
from the international bargain. A small domestic win-set is a bargaining advantage because 
the negotiator can demand higher concessions in order to ensure domestic ratification. 
Therefore, the win-set influences the relative size of the payoffs of the domestic game. 
These implications constitute that: 
The interdependencies between games in domestic and international arenas that can be 
explained as effects of the size of the win-set are also exclusively games in multiple arenas 
for a given win-set. (Proposition 2) 
Differentiating the strategies the negotiator can apply in order to influence the size of the win-
set is a bit trickier. For example, the negotiator can try to enlarge the win-set by influencing 
the preferences and coalitions among the constituency or by changing the rules of the ratifica-
tion process (e.g., by changing the necessary majority rule). Both activities will alter the size 
of the win-set and eventually lead to similar results but their character as nested game is dif-
ferent. Similarly the negotiator could try to move towards a procedural decision in the current 
agreement to alter the decision rules in a future round of negotiations. On both levels, changes 
in procedures and rules are likely to postpone the decision at hand, which points towards the 
long time horizons associated with games in institutional design. However, there may be 
many other reasons for the postponing of decisions that can lead to changes in payoffs as well. 
If the negotiator tries to win the support of domestic constituency groups on the other hand a 
frequent means would be side payments. These side payments could have the character of 
direct compensations or subsidies, in which case they are rather easy to detect. But they can 
also take other forms, entangled with concessions in other policy fields, that may be difficult 
to clearly relate to the effects on the negotiators win-set. Nevertheless, it could be precisely 
those deals across domestic policy fields that in some cases are responsible for inconsistent 
behavior of a countries’ negotiators at different forums. As noted above, the framework needs 
to account for the possibility of complex linkages between domestic policy fields, including 
the occurrence of strategies that have mixed characteristics of games in multiple arenas and 
games in institutional change.  
Referring to the premise above, that games in multiple arenas and games in institutional 
design are the only and mutually exclusive types of variations in game configuration we can 
structure the remaining interactions somewhat with this last proposition: 
Games with strategies that alter the size of the win-set vary either in rules or in payoffs. 
Long time horizons are an indication, but not a proof, of changes in rules (games in 
institutional design) while the existence of side-payments indicates changes in payoffs 
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tutional design) while the existence of side-payments indicates changes in payoffs (games 
in multiple arenas. (Proposition 3) 
While this last proposition is admittedly vague it may nevertheless be useful in guiding the 
search for explanations. Other indicators for different strategies may become available in the 
course of research. For instance, a detailed analysis of position statements during negotiations 
is likely to reveal when the negotiator focuses at changes in the substantive outcome (altering 
payoffs) or procedural aspects (altering rules). 
Taken together the three propositions allow to differentiate interactions as games in multi-
ple arenas (GMA) or games in institutional design (GID). Figure 3  
Figure 3: The framework with differentiated games. 
Source: compiled by the author 
As stated by proposition 1 there is only one type of international games, represented by arrow 
A. As interactions between the international and domestic levels we are likely to find up to 
four types of games that, next to their character, can be further differentiated according to the 
elements that can be assumed fixed or variable. According to proposition 2, a fixed win-set, 
and fixed rules in both arenas allow us to interpret an interaction as game in multiple arenas. 
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The negotiator maximizes payoffs over games in both arenas (B1). If the win-set is variable 
and we observe side payments or log-rolling on the domestic (international) level we can as-
sert that the negotiator aims at improving domestic (international) support. In doing so the 
negotiator can not only ‘buy’ domestic support to improve the chances of concluding an 
agreement on the international level, but also exploit international pressure to facilitate do-
mestic policy moves that were otherwise infeasible internally (Putnam 1988: 457). Through 
the application of such strategies the negotiator can broaden the range for autonomous deci-
sions on international or domestic policies according to his or her private preferences9. Fur-
thermore, there are two possible games in institutional design (C1 and C2) in which the win-
sets are flexible and the payoffs in both arenas are assumed to be fixed in order to allow for 
the consideration of variations in the rules of the game10. The negotiator can try to alter do-
mestic rules (e.g., ratification procedures – C1) or international rules (postponing of a deci-
sion or changing the agenda, etc. – C2).  
Table 1: Possible Game Constellations 
Source: compiled by the author 
                                                 
9  This implies that the assumption that the highest priority of state leaders is to stay in power, needs to be treated with care, 
particularly if the negotiator is a delegate whose interests may differ substantially from those of the statesman. Negotiator 
Selection may lead to principal-agent problems between the state leader (the government in power) and the negotiator, if 
the negotiator’s well being does not depend on international-level outcomes. 
10  Note that the assumption of fixed payoffs refers only to the considered time period. As noted earlier, games in 
institutional design seek to explain the inter-temporal maximization of payoffs. That means that in the long run payoffs 
are flexible in at least one of the arenas. 
Principal
Arena
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Arena
Win set Rules Payoffs Indicators
International GMA (A) international international variable
Two-level GMA (B1) fixed I: variable
D: fixed
partial autonomy of
the negotiator
Two-level GMA (B2)
fixed
I: fixed
D: variable side payments
Domestic GID (C1) I: fixed
D: variable Long time horizons
International GID (C2)
international domestic
variable
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Explanation:
• Payoffs are payoffs to the negotiating statesman in the arenas under consideration
• GMA = Games in Multiple Arenas
• GID = Games in Institutional Design
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According to the propositions these are the exhaustive game constellations that occur in inter-
actions on the international level and between domestic and international decision making. If 
domestic policy fields are separated there will be additional sub-games of policy coordination 
on the domestic level. These could be represented by a number of additional horizontal inter-
actions between political actors and constituent groups of different policy fields. A strong 
separation of domestic policy-fields will make the two-level games of a country appear as 
separate and independent interactions (two boxes on the domestic level), while closely coor-
dinated policy fields would be better represented by a single box.  
What will be the impact of separated or integrated domestic policy fields on a countries’ 
strategy on the international level? From this framework one can hypothesize that countries 
with separated policy fields will be less aware of inconsistencies in their international posi-
tions and less likely to see the need for reconciliation. This would support explanations for 
functional overlap and incoherence based on different normative principles and distributive 
effects of international agreements, as both effects are likely to be more pronounced if interac-
tions among the relevant groups are limited. Regarding the negotiators’ ability to strategically 
exploit functional overlaps on the international level it would be necessary to analyze the im-
pact of separated policy fields on the payoff structure in the vertical two-level games. How 
are the negotiators’ domestic payoffs affected by the horizontal interactions between domestic 
policy fields? 
The following section discusses some formal models of two-level games that could serve 
as a basis to explore this question. Such analysis will nevertheless be of limited use if we are 
confronted with games in institutional design, which are most likely to occur in conjunction 
or close connection with any game in multiple arenas we can observe. This parallel occur-
rence of the two game types limits the explanatory power of models that capture only the as-
pects of games in multiple arenas. 
4.6 Formal Models of Two-Level Games 
Since the publication of Putnam’s article some efforts have been made to develop formal 
models of two-level games. Most of this work focuses on the elaboration of a proof of the 
conjecture that a small win-set is a bargaining advantage for the negotiator on the interna-
tional level. Iida (1993) finds that a domestic constraint on one side can be a advantageous if 
the constraint is very high and if the negotiator is patient; Mo (1994) analyses the influence of 
(veto-) power distribution among domestic constituents on the bargaining advantage; and 
Milner and Rosendorff ( 1997) show that elections can reduce the executives influence on 
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other negotiators if they lead to greater government division. In an extension of Iida’s model, 
Tarar (2001) discusses the implications if both negotiators are constrained by their domestic 
constituents, finding that a high constraint can benefit the negotiator who moves second in 
making a proposal, but that the advantage is dependent on the availability of information on 
each others constraints.  
Several articles use estimations of the relative size of win-sets to explain the ratification of 
particular treaties. Koenig and Hug (2000) for example analyze the win-sets of the twelve EU-
members under their respective domestic decision rules in the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty, using spatial solution concepts. They show that there is a significant relationship be-
tween a governments’ policy positions and its political institutions. If international agree-
ments have important domestic implications the survival of governments can be threatened by 
the proposition of an international treaty, particularly if the approval requirement for ratifica-
tion is higher than the majority needed for government formation (qualified majorities or ref-
erendums). 
Finally, Milner (1997) develops a full theory of domestic influences on international nego-
tiations that shows under which conditions domestic politics matter and which domestic ac-
tors influence the terms of the international agreement. She analyses different scenarios of 
domestic power sharing and asymmetric information between the executive and the legislative 
as well as the role of interest groups. These act as endorsers who can supply necessary infor-
mation about a proposed agreement to the legislative. Her findings include: power sharing and 
divided government make international cooperation less likely, the impact of the legislative 
on an agreement depends on the preference structures of domestic actors and institutions of 
power sharing, asymmetric information can under some conditions improve the prospects for 
international cooperation, and interest groups play a crucial role as endorsers of agreements 
who can assist the legislative in reducing uncertainty about the agreement at hand. Milner also 
argues that domestic actors have an interest in changing the institutions that determine power 
sharing, particularly ratification procedures, in order to increase their influence over the terms 
of an agreement or their power to prevent its ratification otherwise. These strategies lead to 
issue specific ratification procedures, pushed for by different central actors. Her analysis sug-
gests the differentiation between games in multiple arenas and games in institutional change 
made here. It provides a bases for determining under which conditions actors have an incen-
tive to engage in either type of strategic behavior. Furthermore, the notion of issue specific 
ratification procedures points towards a potential cause of incoherence in international gov-
ernance due to functional overlap. If negotiations in one issue area are dominated by execu-
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tive and the other by legislative preferences, the outcome may be contradicting. This tendency 
is re-enforced by institutions for ratification that further strengthen the position of the domi-
nating actor, as well as the political influence of the respective interest groups. 
These models of two-level games in international negotiations provide a useful basis for 
the development of a theoretical approach to the explanation of incoherence due to functional 
overlap. While the development of a general theory is still at an early stage, many useful in-
sights can be gained through the exploration of different scenarios building on the findings 
that have been derived so far. 
5 Summary and Discussion 
The phenomenon of incoherence in international governance due to functional overlaps 
among different international agreements represents a difficult challenge to theories of inter-
national relations. In this paper, I have argued that the determinants of such incoherence, par-
ticularly its long-term persistence, can only be understood by means of a systematic analysis 
of interactions among international negotiating arenas and corresponding domestic policy 
making fields, respectively. The first theoretical challenge, the aggregation of factors from 
different levels of analysis, can be overcome by a two-level games approach that shifts the 
focus of attention to the behavior of the negotiating actor rather than that of states. This shift, 
however, changes the fundamental assumptions of existing systemic and economic theories of 
international cooperation and requires the development of an adjusted deductive structure for 
the development of testable hypotheses. The development of formal tools to model the rele-
vant international and domestic interactions is further complicated by the phenomenon of in-
tended institutional change. Due to its complex and long term nature, the behavior of actors 
engaged in games in institutional design may not be fully explicable as rational decisions, 
even in the context of well specified networks of nested games. 
The framework presented here attempts to provide a first step towards structuring the 
wealth of empirical observations and allowing systematic analysis of the phenomenon of in-
coherence. It allows to characterize and categorize the vast number of interactions by identify-
ing their principal and contextual arenas and the variability of win-sets, rules and payoffs. 
This typology allows a broad classification of the relevant interactions according to their 
characteristics as games in multiple arenas (games with variable payoffs) and games in insti-
tutional design (games with variable rules). For interactions of mixed or ambiguous character, 
the discussion has shown that long time horizons and a concentration on procedural rather 
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than substantial matters can, but do not have to, indicate strategies that aim at changing the 
institutional structure. For games in multiple arenas some formal two-level game models are 
available for rigorous theoretical analysis of negotiator behavior in international arenas. The 
challenge is to expand these models to adequately account for the existence of different inter-
national arenas with functional overlaps. These considerations furthermore point towards the 
role of coordination among domestic policy fields as one possible factor that may be respon-
sible for inconsistencies or lack of awareness in a countries international positions. With these 
elements the framework can be a useful guide in the development of a more systematic and 
complete approach to the analysis of institutional interaction in international policy making 
and governance, particularly for the investigation of inefficiencies due to incomplete and con-
tradicting provisions in areas affected by functional overlap. 
In this way it might lead the way to a more general theory that accommodates existing ex-
planations from descriptive analysis, namely those that construe incoherence as a result of 
differentiating norms and principles, distributive structures or strategic exploitation of over-
laps in the interest of particular political or constituent actor groups. 
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